The headlines read like a script from a 19th-century colonial ledger. The UK and France are gathering in a room to discuss "escorting" merchant vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. On paper, it sounds noble. It sounds like global leadership. In reality, it is a desperate attempt to use multimillion-dollar destroyers as glorified security guards for private companies that have failed to adapt to modern reality.
For decades, the shipping industry has lived under a delusion of guaranteed safety provided by Western taxpayers. We are told this is about protecting the "global economy." That is a lie. This is about socializing the risk of private logistics while the profits remain strictly private. By sending high-end naval assets into a narrow chokepoint to fend off asymmetrical threats, we aren't securing trade. We are delaying a necessary evolution in how the world moves goods. Meanwhile, you can find other stories here: The Mechanics of Dignified Diplomacy: Deciphering Iran's Strategic Negotiation Framework.
The Asymmetry Trap
Navies are currently playing a game they cannot win.
Consider the math. A Type 45 destroyer costs upwards of £1 billion. A single Sea Viper missile, used to intercept a drone or a low-cost ballistic missile, costs between £1 million and £2 million. The "threat" being intercepted? A repurposed commercial drone or a locally manufactured projectile costing perhaps $20,000. To see the complete picture, we recommend the recent article by The New York Times.
This is not a strategy. It is a slow-motion bankruptcy. When the UK or France "escorts" a tanker, they are effectively spending millions of pounds in ordnance and wear-and-tear to protect a cargo of crude oil that might be worth a fraction of the defense cost. We are using a sledgehammer to swat a fly, and the fly has an infinite supply of brothers.
The "lazy consensus" in defense circles is that "presence" equals "deterrence." It doesn't. In the Strait of Hormuz, presence equals a target. By clustering ships together in an escort formation, we provide a target-rich environment for any actor looking to score a PR win by damaging a Western hull. We are doing the adversary’s job for them by grouping the assets they want to hit.
The Private Sector’s Free Ride
Why is the taxpayer footing the bill for the safety of a Maersk or a Hapag-Lloyd vessel?
When a tech company moves data, they pay for encryption. When a bank moves cash, they hire armored trucks. Yet, when a shipping giant moves a hundred thousand tons of cargo through one of the most volatile regions on Earth, they expect the Royal Navy or the Marine Nationale to provide a free shield.
If these routes are too dangerous to sail without a military escort, then the routes are not commercially viable. Period.
By intervening, Western governments are distorting the market. They are preventing shipping rates from reflecting the true cost of doing business in a high-risk zone. If insurance premiums skyrocketed and shipping lanes shifted, the market would naturally find alternatives—pipeline expansions, rail corridors, or Arctic routes. Instead, we prop up an obsolete 20th-century model of maritime dominance that no longer fits a multipolar world.
The Myth of the "Chokepoint"
Every briefing mentions that 20% of the world's oil passes through Hormuz. This is used as a panic button to justify any level of military expenditure.
But look at the data. The world is not the oil-dependent engine it was in 1973. Strategic reserves are higher. Diversification into renewables is accelerating. More importantly, the actors threatening these lanes—primarily Iran and its proxies—depend on the "freedom of navigation" just as much as the West does. They need to sell their own product.
The threat is often more theatrical than existential. By rushing in with a multinational "mission," we validate the theater. We turn a regional policing issue into a global crisis. We give the disruptors exactly what they want: a seat at the high-stakes table and a direct line into Western headlines.
Stop Escorting and Start Automating
The real solution isn't more sailors on decks; it's fewer people on ships.
The shipping industry is notoriously slow to adopt technology. They are still operating with crews of 20 to 30 people on massive, vulnerable targets. If we want to solve the Hormuz problem, we don't need a meeting in London or Paris to discuss naval formations. We need a massive, accelerated push toward autonomous, unmanned cargo vessels.
An unmanned ship cannot be taken hostage. The "human cost" of a strike drops to zero. The political leverage gained by harassing an empty hull is negligible. Instead of spending billions on naval escorts, that money should be redirected into a "Manhattan Project" for autonomous maritime logistics.
We are currently defending a 15th-century concept—human-crewed wooden (now steel) boxes—with 21st-century weaponry. It’s a mismatch of eras. If a ship is hit and there’s no one on board to die or be captured, the "crisis" disappears. It becomes an insurance claim, not a reason for war.
The Geopolitical Cost of "Helping"
There is a deeper, more cynical truth that the UK and France won't admit at their meeting. These missions are rarely about the ships. They are about maintaining the illusion of relevance.
Both nations are struggling to maintain "blue water" navies on shrinking budgets. By leading a mission in Hormuz, they get to pretend they are still the arbiters of global order. They get to sit at the "Big Power" table.
But this comes at a cost. Every day a destroyer is tied up in the Gulf, it isn't in the North Atlantic or the Indo-Pacific where actual state-on-state competition is happening. We are hollowing out our core national defense to perform security theater for oil companies. It is a strategic blunder of the highest order.
The Hard Truth About Maritime Security
I have seen the internal reports where the cost-benefit analysis simply doesn't add up. We’ve watched as billions are poured into "maritime security" while piracy and disruption only become more sophisticated. The "escort" model is a relic.
If you want to secure the Strait of Hormuz, you don't send more ships. You make the ships irrelevant.
- Shift the Liability: Pass laws that require shipping companies to pay a "Security Levy" for every mile they are escorted by a national navy. Watch how fast they find alternative routes or invest in their own defense technologies.
- Hardened Merchantmen: Invest in non-lethal, automated defense systems installed directly on merchant ships—high-powered microwaves, long-range acoustic devices, and rapid-deploy smoke screens.
- Decentralize Energy: Every dollar spent on a naval escort is a dollar not spent on domestic energy independence. The best way to secure the Strait of Hormuz is to make sure we don't care what happens there.
The upcoming multinational meeting isn't a solution. It’s a support group for nations that haven't realized the world has changed. They are meeting to discuss how to keep a dying system on life support.
Stop trying to fix the escort model. It’s time to let it sink.
