The media is obsessed with optics, and the recent coverage of Taiwan firing rockets toward China from a U.S.-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) is the perfect example of theater masquerading as strategy. Headlines treat this drill as a provocative line in the sand, a high-stakes warning shot, or a definitive display of deterrence.
It is none of those things. Building on this idea, you can also read: Why the Crisis in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir Can No Longer Be Ignored.
If you look at this through the lens of actual military logistics and cross-strait strategy, firing a few rockets into the ocean during a heavily choreographed exercise is not a show of strength. It is a symptom of a deeper, systemic misdirection in how the West views the defense of Taiwan. The lazy consensus tells us that advanced, flashy U.S. hardware keeps the peace. The reality is that treating these platforms like a psychological magic wand invites the very instability it claims to prevent.
The HIMARS Fetishization Flaw
Mainstream defense reporting suffers from a severe recency bias. Because HIMARS proved highly effective in the flat, contested plains of Ukraine against fixed logistics hubs, commentators assume the platform translates perfectly to the Taiwan Strait. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of geography and operational mechanics. Observers at The New York Times have shared their thoughts on this trend.
Ukraine is a land war defined by thousands of miles of contiguous territory. The Taiwan Strait is roughly 100 miles of open water.
Let’s dismantle the premise of the "warning shot." Firing a rocket from a mobile launcher during a scheduled training exercise tells an adversary exactly zero new pieces of information. China’s People's Liberation Army (PLA) already possesses meticulous tracking data on Taiwan’s acquisition of the M142 HIMARS. They know the range of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) pods down to the meter. Showing that the system can fire a rocket does not alter the balance of power; it simply confirms that the instruction manual was readable.
Furthermore, the fixation on these high-profile platforms creates a false sense of security. Having a handful of highly mobile launchers is useful only if they survive the opening hours of a conflict. In a real-world scenario, Taiwan’s airspace and electromagnetic spectrum would be heavily contested. The bottleneck is not the launcher itself, but the target acquisition chain. Who provides the real-time telemetry when radar installations are targeted? If the answer relies entirely on orbital data or vulnerable airborne assets, the launcher becomes an expensive, stationary target.
The Strategic Math the Media Ignores
To understand why these public drills are more about political messaging than military utility, we have to look at the raw math of a cross-strait conflict.
- The Cost Asymmetry: A single ATACMS missile costs roughly $1.5 million. The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rounds cost well over $100,000 each. China's strategy relies heavily on mass—mass of cheap drones, mass of naval vessels, mass of short-range ballistic missiles. Attempting to counter mass with hyper-expensive, precision-guided Western munitions on a one-to-one basis is a mathematical impossibility.
- The Supply Chain Bottleneck: Production lines for these advanced munitions are already strained by global demand. Taiwan cannot simply order more rockets off a shelf when a conflict begins. An island nation faces a hard blockade reality; once the shooting starts, what is on the island is all that will ever be on the island.
- The Mobility Myth: HIMARS is praised for its "shoot-and-scoot" capability. On a vast landmass, this is a lifesaver. On an island slightly larger than Maryland, with highly developed urban centers and mountainous terrain, the available roads for heavy military transport are limited and easily monitored by satellite reconnaissance. You can scoot, but you cannot hide forever.
When a drill emphasizes the physical act of firing, it obscures the far more critical—and lagging—metrics: ammunition stockpile depth, resilient command-and-control networks, and decentralized targeting infrastructure.
Dismantling the Deterrence Myth
Ask any standard defense analyst why this drill matters, and they will use the word "deterrence." It is the ultimate shield word, used to shut down critical evaluation. If a military action fails to achieve an objective, it was a provocation; if nothing happens, it was "successful deterrence."
This is flawed logic. True deterrence requires capability, credibility, and communication. Firing rockets into the sea does not establish credibility because it does not simulate the chaotic, degraded environment of an actual invasion attempt.
Imagine a scenario where a military force conducts all its drills with clear blue skies, perfect satellite connectivity, and zero electronic warfare interference. That isn't a training exercise; it's a photo op. The PLA does not look at a televised rocket launch and think twice about their long-term strategic goals. They look at the telemetry, analyze the signatures, and refine their counter-battery algorithms. Publicly parading these systems arguably provides the adversary with more intelligence than it denies them.
The obsession with high-visibility deterrence actually undermines the asymmetrical defense strategy—often called the "porcupine strategy"—that military thinkers have advocated for years. A porcupine does not flaunt its quills by shooting them into the air; it keeps them hidden, numerous, and incredibly painful to touch.
What the Porcupine Strategy Actually Looks Like
If firing advanced U.S. rockets isn't the silver bullet, what is? The answer is unglamorous, inexpensive, and rarely makes for a good headline.
Instead of purchasing small numbers of highly complex, politically sensitive platforms, true defensive resilience lies in mass and redundancy.
Sea Mines and Mobile Anti-Ship Missiles
The most dangerous phase for an invading force is the transit across the strait and the subsequent amphibious landing. This vulnerability is exploited not by long-range surface-to-surface rockets, but by thousands of smart sea mines and truck-mounted anti-ship cruise missiles like the domestic Hsiung Feng series. These can be dispersed among civilian infrastructure, disguised as commercial vehicles, and deployed in numbers that overwhelm any defensive screen.
Decentralized Civil Defense
A military is only as resilient as the society supporting it. True deterrence is the realization by an adversary that taking an island would require a brutal, protracted urban occupation. This means investing heavily in civil defense, distributed medical stockpiles, redundant communication networks (like low-Earth orbit satellite terminals independent of centralized infrastructure), and a highly trained, decentralized reserve force.
Hardened Infrastructure
A rocket launcher is useless if its fuel depot is destroyed in the first wave of a missile strike. The real work of defense involves digging deeper into the mountains, hardening airfields, creating underground command centers, and ensuring that electricity and water grids can withstand prolonged disruption.
None of these measures look impressive in a two-minute news segment. They don't involve fire, smoke, or high-tech Western branding. But they are the exact factors that complicate an invader's calculus.
The Downside of the Contrarian Reality
Admitting that these high-profile drills are largely performative carries a significant political cost. It forces a confession that the current framework of Western arms sales is often driven more by political symbolism and corporate defense lobbying than by strict tactical necessity.
It is easy for politicians in Washington or Taipei to point to a shipment of HIMARS and declare that action is being taken. It satisfies the need for a visible commitment. Shifting the focus to mundane, unglamorous defensive measures requires admitting that the flashy hardware is not a panacea. It requires telling the public that defense is a grueling, expensive process of societal hardening, not a series of clean, high-tech weapon launches.
The media will continue to cover the next drill with the same breathless tone. They will show the smoke trails, quote the official press releases about "resolute defense," and imply that the status quo has been successfully maintained for another day.
Stop looking at the rockets. Look at the stockpiles. Look at the geography. Look at the logistics. If the system is relying on a handful of highly visible weapons to scare off a superpower, the game is already lost. True strength doesn't need to put on a show for the cameras. It waits quietly in the dark.
