Ghassan Salamé is a man who knows the weight of a failed state. The former UN envoy and Lebanese culture minister has spent decades watching the gap between diplomatic rhetoric and the reality of the ground in Beirut widen into a chasm. When he calls on Israel and the international community to let Lebanon "do its job," he is touching on the central paradox of Middle Eastern geopolitics. The Lebanese state cannot do its job because it barely exists as a coherent entity, yet it cannot be allowed to fail further without dragging the entire eastern Mediterranean into a multi-generational conflict.
To understand the current crisis, one must look past the immediate headlines of cross-border skirmishes and delve into the structural paralysis of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). For years, the international community has held up the LAF as the sole legitimate defender of Lebanese sovereignty. Billions of dollars in aid from the United States, France, and Gulf nations have flowed into the institution. The goal was simple. Create a military strong enough to secure the borders but not so strong that it poses a threat to Israel or, more importantly, creates an internal civil war with Hezbollah. This delicate balancing act has left Lebanon with a military that can police the streets but cannot enforce the terms of UN Resolution 1701.
The Myth of UN Resolution 1701
Passed in 2006, Resolution 1701 was supposed to be the definitive framework for peace. It called for the area south of the Litani River to be free of any armed personnel, assets, and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL. Twenty years later, the resolution is effectively a dead letter.
The failure is not merely a lack of will. It is a mathematical certainty born of Lebanon’s fractured political system. The Lebanese government is built on a sectarian power-sharing agreement that ensures no single group can dominate, but it also ensures that no single group can lead. When Salamé speaks of letting Lebanon do its job, he is asking for the removal of external pressures that prevent the state from exercising its monopoly on the use of force. However, the internal pressures are just as suffocating. Hezbollah is not just a militia. It is a political party, a social service provider, and a state within a state. Asking the LAF to disarm Hezbollah is asking the Lebanese state to commit suicide.
The Financial Chokehold and Military Readiness
A military runs on its stomach and its wallet. Lebanon has neither. The economic collapse that began in 2019 has wiped out 95% of the value of the Lebanese pound. A soldier’s monthly salary, which used to be worth $800, now barely covers a week’s worth of groceries. This is the "how" of the failure. You cannot expect a soldier to confront a well-funded, ideologically driven paramilitary group when that soldier is worried about buying milk for his children.
The international community’s strategy has been to provide "livelihood support"—direct cash transfers to soldiers. It is a bandage on a gunshot wound. By keeping the LAF on life support, the West prevents the total dissolution of the state, but it does not empower it. Israel, meanwhile, views the LAF with increasing skepticism. From the Israeli perspective, any equipment given to the Lebanese military could eventually end up in the hands of Hezbollah. This creates a ceiling on the type of technology and weaponry the LAF is permitted to receive.
The Dead End of International Mediation
Diplomatic efforts led by the United States and France have focused on a "border for peace" swap. The idea is to finalize the land border between Israel and Lebanon, solving the dispute over the Shebaa Farms and other contested points, in exchange for a Hezbollah withdrawal from the border.
This ignores the fundamental reality of the Iranian "forward defense" strategy. Hezbollah’s presence in Southern Lebanon is not primarily about Lebanese land. It is about regional leverage. For Tehran, the border with Israel is a primary front in a much larger chess game. No amount of Lebanese "sovereignty" can override the strategic requirements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The Strategy of Controlled Instability
There is a growing school of thought among regional analysts that the current status quo is exactly what the major players want. Israel gets a weakened neighbor that cannot mount a conventional war. Iran gets a permanent base on the Mediterranean. The Lebanese political class gets to continue its ritual of corruption while blaming "external actors" for the misery of the population.
Salamé’s plea for Lebanon to be allowed to work assumes there is a functional mechanism to be activated. But the gears have been stripped. The presidency has been vacant for prolonged periods, the central bank is a black hole of forensic audits, and the port of Beirut—the country’s economic heart—remains a ruin. The "job" of a state is to provide security, infrastructure, and a future for its citizens. In Lebanon, the state has been reduced to a clearinghouse for international aid and a theater for sectarian theater.
The Illusion of the Third Way
Western diplomats often speak of a "Third Way"—a path where Lebanon strengthens its institutions independently of both Israeli demands and Iranian influence. This is a fantasy. In the Middle East, power is not granted; it is taken. The Lebanese state will only "do its job" when it is forced to choose between total extinction and the painful process of dismantling the paramilitary structures that define its current existence.
The international community must stop treating Lebanon like a charity case and start treating it like a failed experiment in non-sovereignty. If the LAF is to be the solution, it must be given the mandate and the hardware to actually secure the south, even if that means a direct confrontation with internal actors. Anything less is just more high-level performance art at the UN headquarters.
The time for urging Israel to show restraint or for the international community to "support" Lebanon has passed. The levers of power in Beirut are disconnected from the engine. Until the Lebanese political elite decide that they value a country more than their own bank accounts, the "job" will remain undone, and the borders will remain a tinderbox. The world is tired of waiting for a ghost to act.
Stop sending cash to a military that isn't allowed to fight and start demanding a timeline for the actual implementation of the laws already on the books.
