Somalia has officially condemned Iran’s recent drone and missile strikes against Gulf nations, marking a sharp alignment with Riyadh and a calculated snub to Tehran. However, the diplomatic statement released by Mogadishu contains a glaring, intentional void. By pointedly refusing to mention the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in its message of solidarity, the Somali government has signaled that its internal rift with Abu Dhabi remains a dominant force in its foreign policy. This isn't just about regional security. It is a message about who owns the influence in Mogadishu and who is currently being frozen out.
The move reveals the fragile underbelly of Horn of Africa diplomacy. While the rest of the world views Iranian aggression as a binary issue of regional stability, Somalia views it through the lens of patronage and past grievances. By standing with Saudi Arabia but ignoring the UAE—both of whom were targets of the same regional instability—President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration is playing a dangerous game of selective solidarity.
The Arithmetic of Selective Outrage
Diplomacy is rarely about what is said. It is almost always about what is left on the cutting room floor. When the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted its response to the Iranian escalation, the omission of the UAE was not a clerical error. It was a surgical strike.
For years, the relationship between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi has been defined by friction over port deals, military training programs, and the autonomy of Somali federal member states. The UAE has historically bypassed the central government to deal directly with regions like Puntland and Somaliland, particularly regarding the strategic port of Berbera. This has long been a thorn in the side of the Somali presidency. By excluding the UAE from its "condemnation of aggression," Somalia is effectively telling Abu Dhabi that its security concerns do not merit Somali sympathy until the sovereignty issues regarding those port deals are resolved.
The risk here is obvious. Somalia relies heavily on external security funding and humanitarian aid. Alienating a massive regional power like the UAE while the country is still fighting an existential war against Al-Shabaab is a gamble that assumes Saudi Arabia or Qatar will fill any resulting financial or military void.
Money and Military Might Behind the Stance
The financial trail explains much of this strategic posturing. Saudi Arabia has recently ramped up its direct budgetary support to Somalia, providing the liquidity necessary for the government to function and pay its civil servants. When the money comes from Riyadh, the rhetoric follows.
Contrast this with the UAE’s approach. Abu Dhabi’s involvement in Somalia has shifted toward infrastructure and hard security assets that it controls directly.
- The Berbera Expansion: A multi-million dollar investment that Mogadishu views as an infringement on its territorial integrity.
- Military Training Disruption: Previous instances where Somali authorities seized millions of dollars from Emirati planes, leading to the collapse of UAE-led training programs for Somali soldiers.
- Federal Fractures: UAE support for regional leaders who often challenge the central government’s authority.
This tension has created a vacuum where Iran's actions become a tool for Somali leverage. By aligning with the "Saudi camp" but excluding the UAE, Somalia is attempting to force a renegotiation of its terms with Abu Dhabi. They are using a global security crisis to settle a local neighborhood dispute.
The Iranian Shadow and the Red Sea Stakes
Iran’s influence in the Horn of Africa is often overstated in terms of direct military presence, but its ability to disrupt trade through the Red Sea is an absolute reality. Somalia sits on the longest coastline in Africa, overlooking the very shipping lanes that Iranian-backed proxies threaten.
If Somalia were to offer a unified front with all Gulf states, it would strengthen the naval coalition currently attempting to secure these waters. Instead, the fragmented response from Mogadishu suggests that the Red Sea's security is being held hostage by internal political bickering. This is not just a problem for Somalia; it is a problem for global trade.
The "retaliatory" nature of Iran’s attacks—often framed as a response to Israeli or Western actions—puts Somalia in a difficult position. Mogadishu wants to be seen as a responsible international actor, yet it cannot afford to ignore the domestic pressure from various factions that see the UAE as an interventionist force.
The Cost of the Snub
What does Somalia gain by ignoring the UAE’s security? In the short term, it scores points with a domestic base that is weary of "foreign interference" in Somali ports. It also pleases other regional rivals who are competing with the UAE for dominance in the Horn.
However, the long-term costs are mounting.
- Security Gaps: The UAE was a major provider of counter-terrorism training. Without a thaw in relations, Somali special forces lose access to high-grade equipment and intelligence.
- Investment Freeze: Beyond ports, the UAE is a massive potential investor in Somali livestock and energy. Those taps remain closed as long as the diplomatic cold war continues.
- Regional Isolation: Within the Arab League, Somalia’s selective condemnation makes it look like a proxy for specific interests rather than a sovereign state with a consistent foreign policy.
The reality of the situation is that Somalia cannot afford to have enemies in the Gulf. The country is currently undergoing a massive debt relief process and requires a unified front from all its creditors and partners. Picking sides in a fight between its two biggest potential benefactors is a strategy that only works if one side is willing to completely replace the other. So far, there is no evidence that Saudi Arabia is willing to pay the price for Somalia to permanently walk away from the UAE.
A Legacy of Fractured Alliances
To understand the current bitterness, one must look at the 2017 Gulf Crisis. When Saudi Arabia and the UAE led a blockade against Qatar, Somalia attempted to remain neutral. That neutrality was seen as a betrayal by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, leading to a freeze in aid that nearly crippled the Somali state.
Current President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is trying to navigate a different path, but the scars of that era remain. The current stance is a reversal: instead of neutrality, he is choosing a "privileged partnership" with Saudi Arabia. This is a move toward a more transactional foreign policy. Mogadishu is no longer interested in being the "brother" to all Gulf nations; it wants to be the partner of the highest bidder.
This transactional approach is visible in how Somalia handles the "retaliatory" narrative of Iran. By framing Iran as the sole aggressor against the Saudis, they ignore the complex web of proxy wars that the UAE is also deeply involved in across Yemen and Libya.
The Invisible Players
While the headlines focus on the Gulf, Turkey remains the quiet power broker in this equation. Turkey has the largest overseas military base in Mogadishu and provides the most consistent support to the Somali government. Ankara’s own complicated relationship with the UAE—which has fluctuated between open hostility and recent rapprochement—gives Somalia a degree of cover.
If Turkey and the UAE are on speaking terms, Somalia’s snub seems even more isolated. It suggests that Mogadishu is actually more radical in its anti-UAE stance than its own primary patrons in Ankara. This raises questions about whether the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs is acting on a coherent strategy or if the policy is being driven by personal animosity within the upper echelons of the administration.
The Berbera Factor
Everything in Somali foreign policy eventually leads back to the dirt and the docks. The UAE’s investment in Berbera (Somaliland) is viewed by Mogadishu as an illegal act of secessionist support. As long as the UAE continues to treat Somaliland as a de facto independent entity for the purposes of trade and military logistics, the central government in Mogadishu will continue to use every diplomatic opportunity to exclude the UAE from regional solidarity.
This creates a stalemate. The UAE is not going to walk away from hundreds of millions of dollars in port infrastructure. Somalia is not going to recognize the legality of those deals. Iran’s missiles are simply the backdrop against which this deeper, more localized struggle is being played out.
The international community needs to recognize that Somalia’s "condemnation" of Iran is a hollow victory for regional unity. It is a fractured statement from a fractured state. Until the underlying issues of port sovereignty and federal authority are addressed, Somalia’s foreign policy will remain a patchwork of selective alliances that do more to highlight regional divisions than to deter Iranian aggression.
Investors and analysts looking at the Horn of Africa should not be fooled by the surface-level rhetoric of "retaliation" and "condemnation." The real story is the silence. Every time Mogadishu speaks about Gulf security and leaves out the UAE, it is a reminder that the most significant borders in the region aren't the ones on the map, but the ones drawn by bank accounts and port authorities.
The next time a drone flies over the Gulf, look at who Somalia doesn't defend. That is where the real conflict lies. You should monitor the upcoming maritime security summit in Djibouti to see if this exclusion of the UAE continues into the operational planning for Red Sea patrols.
